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Abstract 
 
Determinants of default risk of banks in emerging economies have so far 
received inadequate attention in the literature. Using panel data 
techniques, this paper seeks to examine the impact of macroeconomic 
and endogenous factors on non-performing assets for the period from 
1997-2009. The findings of the study reveal some interesting inferences 
contrary to the perception of few opinion makers. Lending Rates have 
been found to be not so significant in affecting the NPAs contrary to the 
general perception Bank Assets has turned out to be negatively 
significant indicating that large banks may have better risk management 
procedures and technology which definitely allows them to finish up with 
lower levels of NPAs. Further, this study has established that private 
banks and foreign banks have advantages in terms of their efficiencies in 
better credit management in containing the NPAs that indicates that bank 
privatization can lead to better management of default risk. 
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IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC AND ENDOGENOUS FACTORS ON NON-
PERFORMING BANK ASSETS   
 
1. Introduction 
Global financial crisis, which has developed into the most severe crisis of the post-World War 
II crisis, has hit the real economy on a devastating scale resulting in the collapse of financial 
markets and institutions. Moreover, output per capita is projected to slide down in countries 
representing three-quarters of the global economy. The consequent deterioration in the 
economic environment has led to a rise in the overall level of stress in the banking sectors. 
Commercial bank loan charge-offs in the US and Europe may exceed the levels reached 
during the 1991–1992 recession, even though they should remain below the levels 
experienced in the US during the Great Depression.  
On a thorough analysis of the crisis, financial stability has once again emerged as an 
important area of concern in the financial systems across the globe. Financial stability is 
widely accepted as a situation in which financial system is capable of satisfactorily 
performing its three key functions simultaneously: (1) efficient and smooth facilitation of the 
inter-temporal allocation of resources from the surplus economic units to the deficit economic 
units; (2) managing the forward looking financial risks with appropriate pricing; and (3) to be 
prepared all the time to absorb the financial and real economic surprises and shocks. The core 
function of the payment system should therefore not fail as well.  
Counterparty risk, being an important risk in the financial system more particularly of the 
banking system, poses a bigger challenge in order to achieve financial stability. Counter-party 
risk is an outcome directly related to the Non-Performing Assets
1
 [NPAs] of a financial 
institution. Even though NPAs are permanent phenomenon in the balance sheets of the 
financial institutions, if not contained properly, they eventually lead to crisis that can pose big 
threats of contagion that can engulf the financial health of the system. The problem of NPAs 
in the financial sector has been an matter of concern for all economies and resolution of NPAs 
has become synonymous to functional efficiency of financial intermediaries.  
                                                          
1
 Loans that the bank anticipates that it will have difficulty in recovering. NPAs mainly arise due to the default 
of the borrower which involves his inability or unwillingness in meeting the commitments to the loan. Non-
performing assets (NPAs) or bad loans, as they are commonly called, have been a menace for the banking sector 
across the world.  
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As per the Global Financial Stability Report of International Monetary Fund, (IMF, 
2009), identifying and dealing with distressed assets, and recapitalizing weak but viable 
institutions and resolving failed institutions are stated as the two of the three important 
priorities which directly relate to NPAs. In view of this, it is essential to identify and 
understand the determinants of NPAs, which is the motive for this paper.   
This paper is organised into four sections. The next section is a very brief overview of 
the theoretical considerations along with a short review of latest literature. In section 3 
discussion on factors relevant for NPAs is presented. In section 4, the reader will find an 
attempt to model this research on NPAs in an economy. The results are presented in section 5 
showing possible impact of macroeconomic and endogenous determinants on NPAs. Policy 
issues and conclusions follow in the following sections.  
2. Theoretical Considerations 
The critical role of financial and banking development in economic growth in any economy 
has been established by many researchers (Levine, 2004 and Singh, 2005). Goldsmith (1969 ) 
is adamant in pointing to excessive credit growth as the harbinger of all crises. The role of 
how financial crisis could destabilise that role. These pointers should be judged against the 
state of affairs that there is as yet a credible theory of financial market equilibrium. 
In the process of providing credit assistance to the investment activities and projects in 
the economy, financial institutions face inherent risks in the form of default risk which results 
in build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) that have a negative effect on the profitability 
of the financial institutions. Typically a credit transaction involves a contract between two 
parties: the borrower and the creditor (bank) are subject to a mutual agreement on the ‘terms 
of credit’.2 Optimising decision pertaining to the terms of credit could differ from the 
borrower to that of the creditor. As such, the mutual agreement between the borrower and the 
creditor may not necessarily imply an optimal configuration for both. The most important 
reason for default
3
 could be mismatch between borrower’s terms of credit and creditor’s 
terms of credit. However, a common perspective is that both the cases of defaulter and non-
performer imply similar financial implications, that is, financial loss to banks. Moreover, 
                                                          
2
 The ‘terms of credit’ are defined over five critical parameters, viz, amount of credit, interest rate, maturity of 
loans, frequency of loan servicing and collateral. 
3
 A ‘default’ entails violation of the loan contract or the agreed terms of the contract, while a non-performing 
loan entails that the borrower does not renege from the loan contract but fails to comply the repayment schedule 
due to evolving unfavourable conditions. 
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regulatory and supervisory process does not focus on such a distinction between defaulter and 
non-performer as far as prudential norms are concerned. 
A synoptic look at the available literature conveys some useful insights into the 
determining factors of NPAs across countries. Quite a lot of economies have experienced 
such distressed debt cycles. NPA levels and capital to risk (weighted) assets ratio (CRAR) of 
developing and advanced countries presented in Table 1 and the provisions to NPAs and 
return on assets (ROA) of developing and advanced countries captured in Table 2 explain the 
differences in the levels as well as the approaches towards NPA management in different 
countries.  
Bank Regulation based CRAR of select countries is captured in Table 3 and Figure 1. In 
the USA, the non- and sub-performing loans resolution was embedded into the savings and 
loans crisis from 1989 to 1994. In Japan, the NPA cycle began in 1997 and in China and the 
rest of Asia deal with NPAs sub-prime loans (SPLs) since 1999. The origin of the Chinese 
NPAs crisis can be traced to political issues. During the centrally planned economy from 
1949 onwards, loans were granted by state owned banks to state-owned companies without 
proper credit due diligence at predetermined standardised conditions by the government. 
Especially, in the overheated economy of the 1990s domestic credits extended enormously 
and grew by 30 percent year on year between 1992 and 1995 (Chen, 2004; Sprayregen et al., 
2004).  
A typically high leverage in the country shown by a Debt/Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) ratio of 146 percent may be an indicator for the problem of NPAs (see Ernst & Young, 
2001). High leverage was experienced in the real estate sector, particularly during the rise of 
the Japanese real estate bubble in the 1980s. With the burst of the bubble in the 1991 and the 
dramatic economic slowdown, real estate values waned tremendously in the case of Japan. As 
an aftermath, borrowers defaulted on the debt service and lenders had to sign big losses. 
Lacking regulations and tax incentives by the Japanese Government as well as insufficient 
equity reserves of the banks to compensate write-offs of distressed debt, banks tried to deal 
with the problem by a wait-and-see approach. Barseghyan (2004) identifies a link between 
the Japanese government’s reluctance to solve the bad loan problem and the economic 
slowdown. He opines that the Governments behaviour deteriorated the economic situation of 
Japan and affirms this hypothesis by a normative study.  
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In the case of Thailand, the causes for NPAs include factors like liberalized capital and 
current account, a legal system that made credit recovery time consuming and difficult, real 
estate speculations, steep rise in interest rates and inability of the banks to assess the credit 
risk. To overcome the problem the Financial Sector Restructuring Plan (1998) focused on 
capital support facilities for bank recapitalization and setting up of Asset Management 
Corporations (Devakula, Pridiyathorn, 2001). Korean causes for distressed loans were like 
directed credit (Kang, Moon-Soo, 2001), the “compressed growth policy” which backfired 
when slowing demand and rising input costs placed severe stress on their profitability, their 
lack of monitoring and contagion effects. These issues were attempted to be countered with 
measures like; creation of the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and a NPA 
fund to support the acquisition of NPAs (Bama, 2002) and Corporate Restructuring Vehicles 
(CRVs) and Debt/Equity Swaps were made use of to ease the resolution of bad loans. 
Indian banking system has endured the stress of global financial crisis as revealed in the 
advancement in the Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR). On the whole CRAR of 
all (81) Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) improved to 13.2 per cent at end-March 2009, 
continuing to be considerably well above the required minimum of 9.0 per cent. The gross 
NPAs to gross advances ratio (GNPA) continued to be at 2.3 per cent as at end-March 2009 
as it was at end-March 2008. The ROA also remained unchanged at 1.0 per cent at end-
March 2009 over its level at end-March 2008 indicating no deterioration in efficiency with 
which banks deployed their assets. The Return on Equity (ROE) improved from 12.5 per cent 
at end-March 2008 to 13.3 per cent as at end-March 2009, signifying increased efficiency in 
the capital usage by banks.  In India, as in most other countries, NPAs are only an indicator 
of loan performance.  
The degree to which it measures actual performance of banks depends on the quality of 
accounting, auditing, regulation and supervision and the amount of ‘ever greening’ of weak 
loans, through restructuring, which is an incessant problem in India to judge from the 
numerous circulars against the practice, which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has issued 
against it over the last decade. Although NPAs have been substantially reduced since 
regulation was tightened in 1993, especially in the Public Sector Banks (PSBs), the 
momentum has recently slowed down and the levels of NPAs remain high compared to 
international standards (refer o Figure-2). He further argues that the problems of NPAs have a 
sizeable overhang component, resulting from infirmities in the prevailing practices of debt 
recovery, inadequate legal provisions for foreclosure and bankruptcy and hitches in the 
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execution of court decrees. The problem is exacerbated by the regulatory provisions for loan 
classification vis-à-vis international best practices.  
Even though public sector banks have recorded surges in profitability, efficiency in asset 
quality and intermediation costs in the 1990s, they continue to linger with high interest rate 
spreads astonishingly with lower rates of return, and higher operating costs. In an advancing 
rate regime, prime borrowers would switch over to other possibilities such as capital markets, 
internal accruals, etc., for their fund requirements. Under such conditions, banks would have 
no alternative but to mitigate the quality of borrowers which increase the probability of 
generation of NPAs (Bhattacharya, 2001).  
3. Factors Relevant for NPAs 
3.1 Macroeconomic Factors 
Most of the empirical evidence suggests that banks’ NPAs as closely linked to the economic 
activity. In other words, macroeconomic factors matter: downturns/slowdowns in the 
economy, recessions, low rate of savings, weak markets, depressions in industrial production, 
and reduction in per capita income levels and most importantly the inflation levels in the 
economy. A fair amount of the academic literature has dealt with determinants of banking 
crisis, which is the most severe of the consequences of bad loans in a banking system which 
is of valuable understanding as a backdrop for the study of NPAs.
4
  
Dermiguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) employed a Multivariate Logit Framework to 
develop an early warning system for banking crisis and a ratings system for bank fragility. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2005) examined the inter-linkage between bank 
concentration and banking system fragility where they have established that higher bank 
concentration is associated with lower profitability. Lis, et.al.,(2000) have found that Gross 
Domestic Product growth, bank size and Capital had negative effect on NPAs while Loan 
growth, collateral, net interest margin, debt-equity, market power and regulation regime had a 
positive impact on NPAs.  
Resti and Sironi (2001) examined corporate bond recovery rate referring to bond default 
rate, macroeconomic variables such as GDP and growth rate, amount of bonds outstanding, 
                                                          
4
 Non-performing assets is used interchangeably with non-performing loans in this Comment. NPAs are 
measured on either gross basis or on net basis (net of provisions). While the gross NPAs reflects the quality of 
loans made by the banks, net NPAs shows the actual burden of the banks.  
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amount of default, return on default bonds, and stock return wherein it was established that 
default rate, amount of bonds, default bonds, and economic recession had negative effect, 
while the GDP growth rate, and stock return had positive effect on corporate recovery rate. 
Lis et.al.,(2000) used a simultaneous equation model in which they explained bank loan 
losses in Spain using a host of indicators, which included GDP growth rate, debt-equity ratios 
of firms, regulation regime, loan growth, bank branch growth rates, bank size (assets over 
total size), collateral loans, net interest margin, capital-asset ratio (CAR) and market power of 
default companies. They found that GDP growth (contemporaneous, as well as one period lag 
term), bank size, and CAR, had negative effect while loan growth, collateral, net-interest 
margin, debt-equity, market power, regulation regime and lagged dependent variable had 
positive effect on problem loans. Sergio (1996) in a study of non-performing loans in Italy 
found evidence that, an increase in the riskiness of loan assets is rooted in a bank’s lending 
policy adducing to relatively unselective and inadequate assessment of sectoral prospects. 
Interestingly, this study refuted that business cycle could be a primary reason for banks’ 
NPAs. The study emphasised that increase in bad debts as a consequence of recession alone 
is not empirically demonstrated. However, according to Bloem and Gorter (2001) NPAs may 
be caused by wrong economic decision or by plain bad luck.  
There are many internal and external factors affecting NPAs in India. While the internal 
factors might be taking up new projects, promoting associate concerns, business failure, cost 
overruns during the project implementation stage, strained labour relations, inefficient 
management, technology related problems, product obsolescence etc., the external factors 
include GDP growth, default in other countries, high inflation, accidents and natural 
calamities. Further, it is observed that while there is a positive correlation between the factors 
such as GDP growth induce the bank credit. Procyclicality is observed in the case of 
comparison of GDP growth to NPA levels (Figure-3 and Figure-4).  Das and Ghosh (2003) 
established relationship between nonperforming loans of India’s public sector banks in terms 
of various indicators such as; asset size, credit growth and macroeconomic condition and 
operating efficiency indicators.  
Bercoff, Giovanniz and Grimardx (2002) in their study of Argentinean banks tried to 
measure NPAs by using the various bank related parameters as well as macroeconomic 
parameters. Bank specific parameters in their study were Ratio of Networth to Net Assets, 
Bank’s exposure to peso loans, and type of banks such as foreign, private or public. 
Macroeconomic factors in this study were credit growth, reserves adequacy, foreign interest 
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rate and monetary expansion. They have established that variables such as operating cost, 
exposure to peso loans, credit growth, and foreign interest rate had a negative effect on 
NPAs. The macroeconomic variables such as money multiplier and reserve adequacy had a 
positive impact on NPAs. 
Chen et al. (1998) study the relationship between the risks and the ownership structure, 
and it appears that a negative correlation exists between the managers’ shareholdings and the 
risks faced by the financial institution. That means that if the managers’ shareholding 
percentage increases, the financial institution will reduce its own risk behaviour. While 
Berger and De Young (1995) mention that a management team with poor operating capability 
is unable to correctly appraise the value of collateral, which means that it is difficult for it to 
follow up on its supervision of the borrower, its poor credit-rating technology will result in 
management being unable to control and supervise the operating expenses efficiently, thus 
leading to a significant increase in NPLs. Wahlen (1994) also points out that unexpected 
changes in the NPL Ratio may indicate that expected future loan losses are relatively non-
discretionary and negatively related to bank stock returns. Therefore, we have considered the 
various bank groups in Indian Banking based on their ownership structures for the analysis. 
Ownership pattern can also affect the bad loan levels significantly. In times of downturn 
the government would often turn to banks for financial resources through policy loans for the 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Projects financed by these policy loans gave rise to growing 
default rates (Huang, 1999). The biased lending behaviour of the banks to SOEs is supported 
by other research findings as well (Lu et al., 2001). In case of Taiwanese banks the rate of 
non-performing loans decreases as the government shareholding in bank goes higher up to 
63.51 per cent, while thereafter it increases (Hu et al., 2002). Few studies have also indicated 
a relationship between the size of the bank and the level of bad loans. Bank’s sizes are often 
found negatively related to the rate of non-performing loan (Hu et al., 2002). Bodla and 
Verma (2006) have emphasised that financial sector reforms have brought in greater 
competition among the banks and have brought their profitability under pressure.  
Accordingly, banks face a number of challenges such as; worrying level of NPAs, 
stringent prudential norms, increasing competition, growing customer expectations, 
increasing pressure on profitability, liquidity and credit risk management, assets-liability 
management, shrinking size of spread, rising operating expenditure and so on. However, 
Singh (2005) argues that globalization of operations and new technologies development are 
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taking place swiftly and these has given rise to the increase in resource productivity, 
increasing level of profitability, deposits and credits and thereby decrease in NPAs.  
3.2 Endogenous Factors 
The literature on these issues identifies determinants of banks risk taking that can be 
translated into a tractable empirical specification by measuring the effect of observable 
variables like; capital adequacy, credit growth, operational efficiency, branch spread and 
others. Rajaraman, Bhaumik and Bhatia (1999) have explained the variations in NPAs across 
the Indian banks through differences in operating efficiency, solvency and regional 
concentration. Again Rajaraman and Vasishstha (2002) in their empirical study have proved 
that significant bivariate relationship exists between NPAs of the public sector banks and the 
inefficiency problems. Das (1999) has contrasted the different efficiency measures of public 
sector banks by applying data envelopment analysis model and concluded that the level of 
NPAs has significant negative relationship with efficiency parameters.  
Kwan and Eisenbis (1997) have examined the relationship between problem loans and 
bank efficiency by employing Granger-causality technique and found that high level of 
problem loans cause banks to increase spending on monitoring working out and / or selling 
off these loans and possibly become more diligent in administering the portion of their 
existing loan portfolio that is currently performing. Ranjan and Dhal (2003) attempted an 
empirical analysis of the NPAs of Public Sector banks in India and probed the response of 
NPAs to terms of credit, bank size, and macroeconomic condition and found that terms of 
credit have significant effect on the banks’ Non Performing Assets in the presence of bank 
size and macroeconomic shocks. They also found that alternative measures of bank size could 
give rise to differential impact on NPAs. 
4. Empirical Specification and Estimation 
In this section, we introduce the methodology adopted for the empirical analysis. The 
objective here is to identify the determinants of NPAs in Indian Banking. Accordingly, there 
is a need to estimate a relationship of the following form using the panel data consisting of 
different groups of banks in Indian Banking industry (such as State Bank Group, Nationalised 
Banks, Old Private Banks, New Private Banks and Foreign Banks) data across a period from 
1997 to 2009.  
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The equation can be;      
it +  it ------------------(1) 
Where, α represents the intercept, β1,………Βn represent the respective regression coefficients 
for explanatory variables X1 …… Xn.  For estimating the determinants of NPA, the equation 
can be; 
NPAit = ƒ [MEt Eit]    ---------------------(2) 
 
Where, MEt represent the Macro-Economic Variables and Eit represent the Endogenous 
(industry specific) Variables that are believed to determine the level of NPAs. 
Then, the equation would be; 
GNPAit  = α + β1 GDPGRt + β2 PCNNPt  + β3 MCAPt + β4 LRt + + β5 IIPGRt + 
                    + β6 INFLAt + β7 SVGRt + β8 ASSETit + β9 CARit + β10 CDRit + β11 COFit +   
         + β12 ROAit +  β13RUSUBRAit  + β14  CREDGRit  + β15 PSLit  + β16 OERit  + 
                    +  it    ------------------------------------------(3) 
 
Here, the explanatory variables X1 …… Xn are represented by the macro-economic variables 
such as GDP growth rate (GDPGR), inflation rate (INFLA), index of industrial production 
(IIPGR), savings growth rate (SVGR), growth rate in per capital income in NNP (PCNNP) 
and market capitalisation growth rate (MCAP) and endogenous variables such as bank assets 
(natural log) (ASSET), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), credit to deposit ratio, bank lending 
rates (LR), operating expenses to total assets (OER), ratio of priority sector loans to total 
loans (PSL), ratio of rural and semi urban branches to total bank branches and return on 
assets (ROA) that are supposed to determine the NPAs in the Indian context. While ‘i’ 
represents the category of bank group, ‘t’ represents the year and  it represents the 
unexplained residual. This equation is estimated using the regression analysis considering 
gross NPA (GNPA) which is calculated as the ratio of gross non-performing assets to total 
advances and as regressand. 
GDPGR is involved as a determinant in view of its all-pervading effect in the economy 
that may have a say in causing the NPAs. It controls for the macroeconomic conditions that 
owing to the business cycles in the economy have a significant role to play in causing 
defaults in loan repayments.  It is also because of the reasoning that as the GDP increases the 
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amount of NPAs decrease. INFLA is considered as a macroeconomic determinant as it is one 
of the aspects related to Indian economy which affects the banks overall performance 
especially the level of NPAs in the banking system. This is because when Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) takes some steps related to interest rates to control inflation, the defaulters list 
also grows for the banks with the rising interest rates. Further, savings levels in an economy 
explain the savings propensity as well as the economic surpluses available which has a 
relation to the repayment capacity of the borrowers of the banking sector in general. In view 
of this, SGR is considered as a determinant. In addition, in a growing economy like India, 
Capital markets attract a whole lot of investors as well stimulate the capital formation in the 
country which has a bearing on the performance of the organised industrial sector. In view of 
this logic, Bombay Stock Exchange market capitalisation growth rate (MCAP) is considered 
as a determinant.  
It is argued that Non Priority Sector is the prime contributor to the NPAs. To include this 
viewpoint in the study, bank assets (ASSET) is taken as control for whether the bigger banks 
are more vulnerable to the problem of NPAs than their smaller counterparts are. CAR was 
also considered as a determinant in view of the logic that the higher the capital of the banks 
the lower is the level of NPAs. It was also due to the fact that as capital base of the banks 
increases confidence of the bank also increases and gets reflected in their performance thus 
leading to effective recovery of bank loans and bringing down the level of NPAs. ROA is 
considered as an endogenous determinant because of the fact that profitability of banks would 
have a close relation with its NPAs.  
It is obvious in general that the more profitable banks would have less NPAs. In order to 
capture the aggressiveness in lending activity of the banks which can lead to NPAs, credit to 
deposit ratio (CDR) is considered as an endogenous variable. Cost of Funds for the banks 
cause significant strategic decisions in the area of bank lending. In order to account this 
argument, cost of funds (COF) is also considered as a determinant. Growth in bank credit is 
also one of the factors that can determine the emergence of NPAs. In view of this, credit 
growth rate (CREDGR) is considered as one of the determinants. In the area of bank lending 
the lending rates play a significant part. The cheaper the rates the more is the recovery rate, 
the higher the rates the higher the defaults. In order to account this argument, Lending Rates 
are considered.  
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Much of the operating expenses in the bank are believed to be towards employing the 
work force and related resources for credit deployment and recovery. Accordingly, operating 
expenses ratio is also considered as a variable. Proportion of rural and semi-urban bank 
branches (RUSUBRA) has been considered as a determinant to examine whether the location 
of banks i.e, rural and semi-urban areas matter in causing NPAs in banking. The more 
aggressive are the banks in their lending they may end up in pushing riskier loans and thereby 
end up in higher level of NPAs. However, there is a contention that as banks concentrates on 
credit management they may have developed expertise in managing the credit risk and hence 
may sometimes exhibit lower level of NPAs. Therefore the role of lending aggressiveness in 
causing increase in NPAs is still hazy. Ratio of priority sector lending to total bank lending 
(PSL) was included as a determinant in order to account for the argument that the Priority 
Sector Loans are responsible for the most number of defaults (Refer Figure-5). 
Summary Statistics of the explanatory variables is furnished in Table 4 in the Annexures. 
Balanced panel data is used for estimation by employing the EViews tools for detailed 
analysis. Annual data on State Bank Group, Nationalised Banks Group, Old Private Banks 
Group, New Private Banks Group and Foreign Banks Group for the period from 1996-97 to 
2008-09 is obtained from the robust data base of Reserve Bank of India (various issues of 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, the Report of Trend and Progress of Banking in 
India and the published annual audited accounts of individual banks). The choice of the 
period is dictated by several considerations. The first is the availability of published data on 
the variables considered in the study. Secondly, the year 1996-97 marks the rigorous regime 
of the prudential norms as a result of the ‘first generation’ reforms programme initiated in 
1991, so that it would be useful to examine the impact of various determinants and the 
behaviour of different banking sector in terms of NPAs through the initiation of the reform 
process.  Further, the said period covers the significant period of post-liberalisation in Indian 
banking.  
5. Results and Discussion 
The result of the analysis is presented in Table 5 and the nature and strength of the impact of 
macroeconomic and endogenous determinants on NPAs are furnished in Table 6. GDP 
growth rate has no significance on the NPAs whereas as expected Per Capita Income has 
negative significance on NPAs. The coefficient of ASSET has turned out to be negative and 
very significant indicating that large banks may have better risk management procedures and 
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technology which definitely allows them to finish up with lower levels of NPAs. It was also 
observed that CDR is negatively associated with bad loans signifying that higher the CDR the 
lower tends to be the level of NPAs.  
As an alternative macro-economic variable, we employed the Index of Industrial 
Production (IIPGR) instead of GDPGR in Model-2. The results indicate that the coefficient 
on this variable is negatively significant as conjectured. Further, as another variant of the 
aforesaid specification, we introduce the market capitalisation ratio (MCAP) in Model-3 with 
a view to capture the transition from a bank based to market based financial system. The 
result shows that the coefficient is positively significant at 2 per cent level implying that 
transition to market orientation has impinged on the problem loans as the surpluses tend to 
move into the booming markets as investments and thereby affecting the repayments of bank 
loans. 
As is theoretically well established when the ROA has increased, it is resulting in lesser 
amount of problem loans. Accordingly, the analysis has found that ROA is strongly 
associated with the NPAs negatively. Cost of Funds (COF) was found to be significantly 
associated with the NPAs negatively to evidence our viewpoint that as the cost of funds 
increase the banks tend to be very cautious and choosy in their lending thus leading to 
decrease in NPAs. Lending Rates have been found to be not so significant in affecting the 
NPAs contrary to the general perception. The rest of the explanatory variables exhibit 
theoretically expected relationships with NPAs and are self-explanatory as detailed in the 
columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table-6 which explains the Nature and Strength of the Impact of 
Endogenous determinants on NPAs. 
The final subject of interest in this study was whether the NPAs are in any way affected 
by the ownership styles of the banks. This issue was investigated by introducing the 
ownership dummies (SBDUMMY for State Bank Group of banks, NBDUMMY for 
Nationalised Banks, OLDDUMMY for Old Private Banks, NEWDUMMY for New Private 
Banks and FDUMMY for Foreign Banks. The results summarized in Table-5 indicate that 
Private Banks (both Old and New) and Foreign Banks appear to manage their NPAs 
efficiently. State Bank Group and Nationalised Banks appear to lag behind their private 
counter parts in NPA management. 
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6. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
Several policy implications can be gleaned from this analysis. Favourable macroeconomic 
conditions facilitate in NPA management. First, as the banks grow in size, they tend to 
control the NPA owing to efficiency in their management. In this background there is a case 
for consolidation of banks in the public sector to reap this potential of efficiency in scale of 
operations. Larger banks have exhibited better credit risk management with lower NPA 
levels. Secondly, Priority Sector lending by banks is found to be not much significant in 
contributing for NPAs in contrast to the perception of some urban bankers that PSL cause 
NPAs. This supports the contention that branch expansion in rural and semi urban areas for 
extending priority sector credit is a viable proposition and there need not be aversion on this 
by the policy makers as well as the industry heads. Thirdly, Ownership of banks is an 
interesting issue that has been quite often debated. This study has established that private 
banks and foreign banks have advantages in terms of their efficiencies in better credit 
management in containing the NPAs which indicates that bank privatization can lead to better 
management of default risk.  
The above findings infer that better credit risk management practices need to be taken up 
for bank lending. Adequate attention should be paid to those banks with low operating 
efficiency and low capitalisation as also to macroeconomic cycles that appear to be playing 
some role in NPA management. The state owned banks need to be toned up with adequate 
measures to sharpen their NPA management practices. These findings assume crucial 
importance in view of the significance. 
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Table-1:  
NPA levels and CRAR of Developing & Advanced Countries 
Country CRAR NPA/TL 
 
2002 2006 2007 2008 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Developing Economies 
China - - 8.4 8.2 26 7.5 6.7 2.5 
India 12 12.4 12.3 13 10.4 3.5 2.5 2.3 
Indonesia 20.1 21.3 19.3 16.8 24 13.1 4.1 3.5 
Korea 11.2 12.8 12.3 10.9 2.4 0.8 0.7 1.1 
South Africa 12.6 12.3 12.8 12.5 2.8 1.2 1.4 2.6 
Advanced Economies 
Australia 9.6 10.4 10.2 10.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Canada 12.4 12.5 12.1 12.7 1.6 0.4 0.7 1.1 
France 11.5 - 10.1 - 4.2 3.2 2.7 - 
Germany 12.7 - 12.9 - 5 4 2.7 - 
Italy 11.2 10.7 10.4 - 6.5 5.3 4.6 - 
Japan 9.4 13.1 12.9 12.3 7.4 2.5 1.5 1.5 
United 
Kingdom 
13.1 12.9 12.6 - 2.6 0.9 0.9 - 
United States 13 13 12.8 12.5 1.4 0.8 1.4 2.3 
Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
 
 
Table-2:  
Provisions to NPAs and ROA of Developing & Advanced Countries 
Country PROVISIONS TO NPAs ROA 
  2002 2006 2007 2008 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Developing Economies 
China  - - 39.2 115.3 - 0.9 1 - 
India  - 58.9 56.1 52.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 1 
Indonesia  130 99.7 87.7 98.5 1.4 2.6 2.8 2.6 
Korea  89.6 175.2 199.1 155.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 - 
South Africa  46 - - - 0.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 
Advanced Economies 
Australia 106.2 204.5 183.7 87.2 1.4 - 1 0.9 
Canada 41.1 55.3 42.1 34.7 0.4 1 0.9 1.3 
France 58.4 58.7 61.4 - 0.5 - 0.4 - 
Germany - - 77.3 - 0.1 0.5 0.2 - 
Italy - 46 49.5 - 0.5 0.8 0.8 - 
Japan - 30.3 26.4 24.9 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.3 
United 
Kingdom 
75 - - - 0.4 0.5 0.4 - 
United States 123.7 137.2 93.1 84.7 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.3 
 Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
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Table -3:  
Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets  [in percent] 
No. Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 China -5.9 -4.7 2.5 4.9 8.4 8.2 
2 Hong Kong SAR  15.3 15.4 14.9 15.2 13.4 14.3 
3 India 12.7 12.9 12.8 12.3 12.3 13 
4 Indonesia  22.3 19.4 19.3 21.3 19.3 16.8 
5 Korea 11.1 12.1 13 12.8 12.3 10.9 
6 Brazil  16.6 18.8 18.6 17.9 18.9 18.4 
7 Russia  19.1 19.1 17 16 14.9 16.8 
8 France  11.5 11.9 11.5 11.4 10.9 . . .  
9 Germany  12.7 13.4 13.2 12.2 12.5 . . .  
10 South Africa  12.6 12.4 14 12.7 12.3 12.2 
11 Australia  9.6 10 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.3 
12 Canada  12.4 13.4 13.3 12.9 12.5 12.1 
13 Japan  9.4 11.1 11.6 12.2 13.1 12.9 
14 United States  13 13 13.2 12.9 13 12.8 
15 United Kingdom  13.1 13 12.7 12.8 12.9      . . . 
      Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
 
 
 
Table - 4:  
Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Empirical Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
GNPA Gross NPA to Total Advances 6.797 4.710 
ASSET Bank Assets (natural log) 12.432 1.091 
CAR 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (Capital 
to Risk Weighted Assets) 
12.487 1.275 
CDR Credit Deposit Ratio 65.284 12.998 
COF Cost of Funds in percentage 6.224 1.760 
CREDGR 
Bank Credit Growth Rate (Growth in 
real advances) 
20.780 10.962 
GDPGR 
Growth  Rate of real Gross  Domestic 
Product 
6.977 1.902 
IIPGR Index of Industrial Production 6.808 2.155 
INFLA Inflation levels 5.762 1.499 
LR Bank Lending Rates 14.225 1.813 
OER Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.024 0.008 
PCNNP Per Capita Income at NNP 5.323 2.303 
PSL Priority Sector Loans to Total Loans 28.803 8.519 
ROA Return On Assets of banks 0.941 1.604 
RUSUBRA 
Ratio of Number of Rural and Semi-
Urban branches to Total bank branches 
0.395 0.267 
SVGR Savings Growth Rate 16.094 7.317 
  Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
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Table-5: Determinants of NPAs 
Variables Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
Constant 0.0000 
(39.899)** 
0.0005 
(41.648)** 
0.0000 
(42.482)** 
ASSET 0.0001 
(-2.214)** 
0.0475 
(-1.975)* 
0.0004 
(-2.127)** 
CAR 0.6811 
(0.069) 
0.7787 
(-0.052) 
0.5983 
(0.074) 
CDR 0.0000 
(-0.195)** 
0.0000 
(-0.154)** 
0.0000 
(-0.179)** 
COF 0.0022 
(-0.833)** 
0.0000 
(-1.286)** 
0.0004 
(-1.279)** 
CREDGR 0.7566 
(-0.007) 
0.2547 
(-0.018) 
0.1481 
(-0.036) 
GDPGR 
 
0.4074 
(0.550) 
0.2547 
(-0.018) 
0.2936 
(0.602) 
IIPGR -Na- 0.0486 
(-0.721)* 
-Na- 
MCAP -Na- -Na- 0.0219 
(3.710)* 
INFLA 0.8574 
(-0.057) 
0.1425 
(0.870) 
0.2620 
(0.541) 
LR 0.1397 
(0.654) 
0.1368 
(0.389) 
0.0950 
(0.621) 
OER 0.0000 
(151.898)** 
0.0000 
(161.721)** 
0.0001 
(129.149)** 
PCNNP 0.1586 
(-0.775) 
0.0993 
(-0.312) 
0.0206 
(-1.271)* 
PSL 0.0264 
(-0.094)* 
0.0958 
(-0.083) 
0.0212 
(-0.104)* 
ROA 0.0000 
(0.449)** 
0.0033 
(0.326)** 
0.0013 
(0.385)** 
RUSUBRA 0.0914 
(6.220) 
0.1666 
(4.353) 
0.1039 
(5.096) 
SVGR 0.1389 
(-0.053) 
0.2248 
(0.078) 
0.0166 
(-0.165)* 
SBDUMMY 0.7744 
(0.263) 
  
NBDUMMY 0.3470 
(1.103) 
  
OLDDUMMY 0.0341 
(-2.248)* 
-Na- -Na- 
NEWDUMMY 0.0001 
(-1.999)** 
-Na- -Na- 
FDUMMY 0.0000 
(-3.374)** 
-Na- -Na- 
R Square 0.869 0.886 0.879 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.818 0.842 0.828 
Note: ** at 1% level of significance, *   at less than 5% level of significance 
  Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
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Table-6:  
Nature and Strength of the Impact of Macroeconomic  
and Endogenous determinants on NPAs 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
ASSET Negative and Significant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
CAR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
CDR Negative and Significant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
COF Negative and Significant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
CREDGR Negative and Significant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
GDPGR Not Significant Insignificant Insignificant 
IIPGR ------------ Negative and Significant ------------- 
MCAP ------------ ------------ Positive and Significant 
INFLA Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
LR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
OER Positive and Significant Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
PCNNP Insignificant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
PSL Negative and Significant Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
ROA Positive and Significant Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
RUSUBRA Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
SVGR Insignificant Insignificant Negative and Significant 
OLDDUMMY Negative and Significant -Na- -Na- 
NEWDUMMY Negative and Significant -Na- -Na- 
FDUMMY Negative and Significant -Na- -Na- 
 Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
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Figure-1:  
Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
 
   Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
 
Figure-2:  
GNPA levels of Bank Groups in India  
 
                 Source: Compiled by Author based on data from Reserve Bank of India publications 
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Figure-3:  
Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Bank Credit in India 
 
Source: Compiled by Author based on data from Reserve Bank of India publications 
 
 
Figure-4:  
Procyclicality of NPAs: 
Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Gross NPA level – Indian banking 
 
      Source: Compiled by Author based on data from Reserve Bank of India publications 
 
 
Figure-5:  
Priority Sector Loans to Total Bank Credit in India 
 
Source: Compiled by Author based on data from Reserve Bank of India publications 
 
